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WASTING TIME IN CYBERSPACE: 
THE UDRP'S INEFFICIENT APPROACH TOWARD 
ARBITRATING INTERNET DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES 
Chad D. Emersont 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, a new option for resolving Internet domain name disputes 
was introduced with promises of reducing the time and expense in-
curred in domain name disputes. 1 Now, as the Uniform Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP)2 celebrates its recent anniversary,3 
many domain name disputes have not benefited from these promises. 
Internet domain names are an increasingly important and valuable 
asset for many companies and individuals.4 So valuable, in fact, that 
some domain names have sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars, 
t Chad D. Emerson is an assistant professor of law at Faulkner University's 
Thomas Goode Jones School of Law. While working in private practice, he 
represented NetLearning, Inc. in the company's litigation against Dan 
Parisi. He would like to thank Professors Alex Bolla and Don Garner for 
their encouragement, helpful insight, and valuable suggestions in 
preparing this article. Professor Emerson also thanks Elizabeth Bern, 
Amanda Caves, Kevin Phillips, Tracie Livesay, Norm Templeton, and 
Darrel Emerson for their valuable assistance in the researching and editing 
of this article. 
1. See The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), The Management 
of Internet Names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues, Final Report of the 
WIPO Internet Domain Name Process 49 [hereinafter WIPO Final Report], avail-
able at http://arbiter.wipo.int/processes/process1/report/doc/report.doc 
(Apr. 30, 1999) (last visited February 9, 2005); see also Management of In-
ternet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31741, 31746 (June 10, 1998) 
[hereinafter White Paper]. 
2. Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"), Uni-
form Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy [hereinafter UDRPj, at http:/ / 
www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last updated May 17, 2002). In ad-
dition to the UDRP itself, the UDRP contains procedural rules entitled 
Rules for the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution. ICANN, Rulesfor 
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy [hereinafter Rules], at http:/ / 
www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm (last updated Feb. 5, 2002). 
Neither the UDRP nor the Rules contain any express provisions for appeal-
ing a UDRP decision. 
3. See ICANN, Timeline for the Formulation and Implementation of the Uniform Do-
main-Name DiSpute-Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-
schedule.htm (last updated Feb. 5, 2002). The UDRP was adopted on Au-
gust 26, 1999, and implementation documents were approved on October 
24, 1999. Id. 
4. Liji Thomas, WhyYouNeedThatPerfectName. Com, at http://www.zongoo.com/ 
article8457.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2005). . 
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while many others have led to expensive and protracted lawsuits.5 
Recognizing the value of domain names in today's society, the UDRP 
was created to protect the rights of trademark holders in securing do-
main names, while serving as a less expensive and time-consuming al-
ternative for resolving disputes involving these assets.6 
Unfortunately, the UDRPhas failed to reduce the time and expense 
involved in resolving many domain name disputes.7 This inefficiency 
is rooted in several factors, including the UDRPs inability to obtain 
judicial deference from U.S. courts,8 its inability to assert and main-
tain effective jurisdiction over participants to a UDRP action,9 and its 
initial decision to permit an unlimited number of pleadings and fil-
ings in each action. 10 Combined, these problems have led to a stark 
reality: complainants in many contested domain name disputes 
should skip the UDRP and, instead, proceed directly to court. 
This article will explore the birth and development of the UDRP 
and how that development resulted in a process that is void of the very 
benefits needed for the UDRP to serve as an efficient dispute resolu-
tion option. 11 The article will analyze the provisions that hinder the 
UDRPs ability to act as an efficient alternative for resolving contested 
domain name disputes.l2 It will explain how interpretation by U.S. 
courts has undercut the reliability (and thus efficiency) of UDRP deci-
sions.13 This analysis will focus on a widely publicized domain name 
dispute between NetLearning, Inc. and Dan Parisi-one of the first 
UDRP decisions reviewed by a U.S. court.14 The case study will 
demonstrate in real terms how the UDRPfailed to fulfill its promise of 
5. See Jay Hollander, Why and How to Rent a Domain Name, at http:/ / 
www.gigalaw.com/articles/2002-all/hollander-2002-01-all.html (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2005). 
6. See WlPO Final Report, supra note 1, 'll 49; see also White Paper, supra note 1, at 
31746. 
7. See discussion infra Section III. 
8. See, e.g., Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona, 
330 F.3d 617, 626 (4th Cir. 2003) ("Moreover, we give the decision of the 
[UDRP] panelist no deference in deciding this action."); Retail Servs., Inc. 
v. Freebies Publ'g, 247 F. Supp. 2d 822, 827-28 (E.D. Va. 2003), affd,364 
F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating: "Decisions made by arbitration panels 
under the UDRP are not afforded deference by the district court."); see also 
Parisi v. NetLearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 752 (E.D. Va. 2001) (not-
ing that "the UDRP itself calls for comprehensive, de novo adjudication of 
the disputants' rights"). 
9. See discussion infra Section lILA. 
10. See discussion infra Section III.C. 
11. See discussion infra Section II. 
12. See discussion infra Section II. 
13. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
14. Several articles and essays regarding this dispute can be found at: http:/ / 
www.udrplaw.net/UDRPappealsl.htm;http://www.clm.com/pubs/ pub116 
6909_1.html; http://www.perkinscoie.com/casedigest/icdJesults.cfm?key 
word 1 =domain %20name&topic=Domain %20Names. 
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cost and time efficiency.15 The article will conclude by offering three 
proposed changes to the VDRP-changes that would enable it to ac-
complish its goals of providing an inexpensive and timely domain 
name dispute resolution mechanism.16 
The results are clear: for many contested domain name disputes, if 
aggrieved parties truly want to save time and money, they should pro-
ceed straight to court without stopping at the VDRP. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VDRP AND ITS ULTIMATELY 
INEFFICIENT DESIGN 
To fully understand why the VDRPis inefficient for many contested 
domain name disputes, one must first examine how it came to be. 
Doing so reveals that, in many respects, the efficiency of the VDRP for 
contested matters was probably doomed from the start. 
Commentators generally agree that the Internet was created around 
1969.17 It started as a system of U.S. Military and Department of De-
fense networked computers known as "ARPANET" (Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency Network), which was first administered by the 
Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA).18 By the end of 1969, ARPANET consisted of four "host 
computers" and the "budding Internet was off the ground."19 
During the following years, ARPANET added computers to its net-
work while researchers completed a host-to-host protocol and other 
network software.2o The original plans called for limiting network ac-
cess to individuals involved in defense, education, and research 
initiatives. 21 
One of the next big benchmarks in Internet history occurred in 
1972 when developers introduced "electronic mail."22 Developers 
were motivated to create this "hot application" by a need for a device 
15. See discussion infra Section IV. 
16. See discussion infra Section V. 
17. E.g., Sharon K. Sandeen, The Sense and Nonsense of Web Site Terms of Use Agree-
ments, 26 HAMLINE L. REv. 499,504 (2003); Steven Blackerby, Flat Broke and 
Busted, but Can I Keep My Domain Name? Domain Name Property Interests in the 
1st, 5th, and 11th Circuits, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 117, 120 (2003). 
18. White Paper, supra note 1, at 31742. 
19. Barry M. Leiner et aI., A Brief History of the Internet, Internet Society, at 
http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml (last revised Dec. 10, 
2003). 
20. Id. 
2l. Sandeen, supra note 17, at 505. Significantly, existing plans contemplated 
allowing private parties to use "similar technology to create their own net-
works." Id. Examples of these networks included online service providers 
such as Prodigy, CompuServe, and AOL which, before the growth of to-
day's Internet, allowed millions of private individuals to communicate via 
their computers through the bulletin board systems. Id. 
22. Leiner et aI., supra note 19. 
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that simplified communication and coordination.23 This initial (and 
fairly simple) e-mail technology was soon expanded by the creation of 
an e-mail program that could "list, selectively read, file, forward, and 
respond to messages."24 Mter this development, e-mail became the 
most prevalent network application in a decade and was a forerunner 
of World Wide Web activity because of its ability to facilitate" 'people-
to-people' traffiC."25 Quite simply, e-mail provided a new way for peo-
ple to communicate.26 
In the early 1980s, DARPA ceased management of the Internet.27 
When this occurred, the Internet strayed from its original military re-
search initiatives, although some users continued to use it for non-
military research and educational purposes.28 During this time, the 
National Science Foundation (NSF) was largely responsible for fund-
ing the Internet. 29 By the early 1990s, administrators phased out 
ARPANET.30 
The 1980s also found developers introducing personal computers 
and workstations that, in turn, allowed the budding Internet to 
thrive.3l This led to the Internet's evolution from a primarily non-
commercial research device to a more commercialized venture.32 
During this time, personal and home computer use, as well as the 
Internet itself, increased exponentially.33 The primary engine for this 
change is traced to a World Wide Web application, which enabled 
Internet users to connect with networked computers through user-
friendly graphical interfaces called web browsers.34 
Beginning in 1991, the NSF assumed responsibility for organizing 
and supporting the administration "of the non-military portion of the 
Internet infrastructure."35 To accomplish this, the NSF entered into 
an agreement with Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) in 1992 to provide 
certain Internet-related services, including the registration of domain 
names.36 At that point, NSI managed much of the Internet domain 
name system, including key registration and coordination functions.37 





27. White Paper, supra note 1, at 3174l. 
28. Blackerby, supra note 17, at 120-2l. 
29. Id. at 120. 
30. White Paper, supra note 1, at 31742. 
31. Leiner et aI., supra note 19. 
32. Blackerby, supra note 17, at 120-2l. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 121. 
35. White Paper, supra note 1, at 31742. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
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neric top-level domains (gTLDs).38 In addition, NSI compiled "a di-
rectory linking domain names with the internet protocol (IP) 
numbers of domain name servers."39 
In 1992, Congress gave the NSF authority for allowing commercial 
activity on the NSFNET.40 This authority, as well as the development 
of private and competitive networks, led to an increased commerciali-
zation of the Internet, especially through the development of com-
mercial products that utilized the new Internet technologyY 
Increased commercialization resulted in vendors using Internet tech-
nology in their products.42 These efforts, however, lacked technical 
and strategic information, which resulted in many seeing the entire 
effort as an irritation.43 Commercial vendors and Internet creators 
worked together in conferences, tutorials, meetings, workshops, and 
training sessions to implement a solution.44 Following these efforts, a 
new phase of commercialization occurred and the Internet developed 
into more of a "commodity service."45 
Another major milestone occurred in 1991, when Tim Berners-Lee 
directed the development of hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) and 
hypertext markup language (HTML).46 The creation of HTTP and 
HTML "made the transferability and accessibility of information on 
the Internet easier and led to the creation of 'the World Wide 
Web."'47 Congress followed this breakthrough development by grant-
ing the NSF statutory authority to commercialize NSFNET.48 These 
two events are often lauded as the crucial "events leading to the wide-
spread commercial use of the Internet."49 
A. The Creation of the Internet Domain Name System 
In order to send information from computer to computer, 
networked computers need to have "addresses" where they can locate 
information.5o Administrators solved this problem by creating a sys-
tem for addressing each computer. 51 This involved merging two dis-









46. Sandeen, supra note 17, at SOS. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at S05-06; Holger P. Hesterrneyer, The Invalidity of ICANN's UDRP Under 
National Law, 3 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REv. 1,7 (2002). 
49. Sandeen, supra note 17, at S06. 
so. Hestermeyer, supra note 48, at 6-7. 
S1. See id. at 7. 
S2. WIPO Final Report, supra note 1, 'Il 4. 
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The Domain Name System used addresses that included both alpha-
betical characters and numbers because of individual users' ability to 
"remember names better than numbers."53 Specifically, "[dJomain 
names are the alphanumeric text strings to the right of an '@' symbol 
in an e-mail address, or immediately following the two slashes in a 
World Wide Web address."54 
On a simplistic level, domain names enable Internet applications to 
"talk to" servers on the Internet.55 The Domain Name System trans-
lates the alphanumeric web addresses into the numeric IP addresses 
that the network uses to allow a computer to access a certain web 
site.56 Domain names must be unique or Domain Name System serv-
ers (as currently designed) will not know the corresponding IP ad-
dress to which to convert the domain name. 57 
The foundation of the Domain Name System is a hierarchy of 
names.58 The top-level domains are normally "divided into two cate-
gories: the generic top-level domains (gTLDs) and the country code 
top-level domains (ccTLDs)."59 The gTLDs are also separated into 
two different types, those that are open and those that are restricted. 6D 
Open gTLDs include . com, .net, and .org, and have no restrictions on 
who may register names in these domains.61 Restricted domains in-
clude .int, which is only used by international organizations; .gov, 
which is only used by United States federal government agencies; .edu, 
which is only used by colleges and universities; and . mil, which is only 
used by the U.S. Military.62 The country code top-level domains are 
derived from a two-letter country code-some of which are restricted 
and some of which are open.63 
The creators of the Domain Name System did not contemplate that 
these addresses would reflect trademarks.64 However, companies real-
ized that their domain names could become very valuable resources in 
marketing their businesses.65 This resulted in business owners want-
ing to register their trademarks and trade names as their Internet ad-
dress, rather than a random domain name that customers are less 
53. Blackerby, supra note 17, at 12l. 
54. A. Michael Froomkin, lCANN's "Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy"-Causes 
and (Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 605, 615 (2002). 
55. Karl M. Manheim & Lawrence B. Solum, An Economic Analysis of Domain 
Name Policy, 25 HAsTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 359, 366 (2003). 
56. Blackerby, supra note 17, at 12l. 
57. Froomkin, supra note 54, at 619. 
58. WIPO Final Report, supra note 1, 1[ 4. 
59. Id.; see also 'White Paper, supra note 1, at 31742. 
60. WIPO Final Report, supra note 1, 1[ 6. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id., 1[ 7. 
64. Hestermeyer, supra note 48, at 7. 
65. Id. 
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likely to remember or associate with their business.66 Once Internet 
users realized that domain names could be a "brand," businesses 
quickly concluded that trademark rights should apply to correspond-
ing domain names in order to protect their interests.57 
The Internet Society (ISOC) led the first comprehensive effort to 
restructure the Domain Name Administration.68 InJanuary 1992, the 
ISOC consisted of people involved with the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) , whose purpose was to support the engineering tasks of 
the Internet.69 ISOC recognized the international extent of the prob-
lem and the interests concerned, and formed an International Ad 
Hoc Committee (IAHC), which represented several agencies. 70 The 
IAHC suggested that Administrative Domain Name Challenge Panels, 
administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), be formed to resolve domain name disputes. 71 Under this 
system, registrars of domain names would be obligated to follow the 
decisions of the panel, but the decisions would not affect "the power 
of competent courts."72 
In February 1997, the IAHC contributed to a final report that ad-
dressed recommendations for the administration and management of 
gTLDs.73 On July 1, 1997, President William Jefferson Clinton in-
structed the Department of Commerce to privatize the Domain Name 
System to increase competition and assist international participation 
in the management of Domain Name System.74 Under this Frame-
work for Global Electronic Commerce, domain names would receive 
intellectual property protection even though normal addresses do 
not.75 On July 2, 1997, the Department of Commerce issued a Re-
quest for Comments that sought input on the overall administrative 
framework of the Domain Name System, the creation of new top-level 
domains, domain name registrars' policies, and trademark issues.76 
B. The Green and White Papers: Two Defining Documents for Domain 
Name Rights 
In January 1998, after receiving comments to the Department of 
Commerce'sJuly 1997 request, the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration (NTIA), an agency of the Department of 
Commerce, issued A Proposal to Improve the Technical Management of In-
66. Id. 
67. Froomkin, supra note 54, at 620. 
68. Hestermeyer, supra note 48, at 10. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 11. 
72. [d. 
73. WIPO Final &part, supra note 1, ~ 15. 
74. Id., ~ 16. 
75. Id., ~ 24. 
76. Id., ~ 16. 
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ternet Names and Addresses (the Green Paper).77 The Green Paper dis-
cussed issues such as the creation of a private U.S. corporation 
managed by a "globally and functionally representative Board of Di-
rectors. "78 The Green Paper stated that existing procedures for conflict 
resolution were "expensive and cumbersome"79 and insisted on a bal-
ance between the Internet community and trademark holders in 
which trademark holders received the same rights on the Internet as 
they do in the physical world.80 
The Green Paper also stressed that the proposed entity be incorpo-
rated under the laws of the United States.81 In support, the Green Pa-
per looked to the United States' significant experience with the 
Domain Name System.82 Even though the corporation would be in-
corporated in the United States, it would remain subject to the juris-
diction of other nations.83 The Green Paper suggested that this 
corporation be structured as a private, nonprofit entity charged with 
coordinating specific Domain Name System functions for the Internet 
as a whole.84 WIPO reiterated its desire that the process only encom-
pass international protection of intellectual property rights, rather 
than serve as a comprehensive Internet governance structure.85 
The Green Paper also recommended that the domain name dispute 
resolution process be conducted online and that each domain name 
registry develop its own system with prescribed minimum standards.86 
These systems should provide that, if a trademark holder objects to 
the registration of a domain name within a set time, the domain name 
registrar should temporarily suspend that registration from any use.87 
In order to establish consistent and predictable locations in which to 
resolve disputes, the Green Paper suggested that all domain name regis-
tration contracts have a clause requiring registrants to consent to the 
jurisdiction of the country where the domain name registry is located 
or the country where the relevant "A" server is located.88 
Further comments and discussions about the Green Paper led to the 
publication of the Statement of Policy on the Management of Internet Names 
77. Id., ~ 17. 
78. Id. 
79. Hestermeyer, supra note 48. 
80. Id. 
8l. "White Paper, supra note 1, at 31744. 
82. Id., at 31744-45. 
83. Id., at 31745. Even though the Green Paper realized that incorporating 
under United States laws would cause dissent, it also realized the practical 
reality that, if the corporation were located elsewhere, similar objections to 
location would still arise. White Paper, supra note 1, at 31745. 
84. Hestermeyer, supra note 48, at 13; "White Paper, supra note 1, at 31744. 
85. Hestermeyer, supra note 48, at 16-17. 
86. Id., at 13. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
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and Addresses (the White Paper) inJune 1998.89 In this paper, the gov-
ernment agreed that trademark owners were victimized by some abu-
sive domain name registration practices.90 "Cyber-pirates" were 
victimizing trademark owners by registering domain names similar, if 
not identical, to the owner's trademark, and then selling the domain 
names to the trademark holder at a profit.91 
As with its predecessor, the White Paper proposed establishing a pri-
vate, nonprofit U.S. corporation to generally govern the Internet.92 
The White Paper suggested that W1PO create a procedure for welcom-
ing trademark holders to the Internet community and develop pro-
posals for uniform resolution of trademark domain name disputes.93 
The recommendations in the White Paper distinguished between sit-
uations that would not be covered by the proposed recommendations 
(such as domain name disputes between two trademark holders) and 
those that would be covered (such as domain name disputes between 
a trademark holder and someone who does not have a trademark).94 
The conclusion was that this new domain name dispute system would 
focus only on situations that fell under the latter category.95 
C. The WIPO Report 
Following the recommendations of the Green Paper and the White 
Paper, W1PO published an interim report in December 1998 that ad-
dressed domain name dispute resolution.96 The W1PO report recom-
mended that, in domain name disputes, domain name registration 
agreements include a clause requiring registrants to submit to the ju-
risdiction of its country of domicile and the country where registra-
tion authority is located, if these countries are members of the Paris 
Convention or the A~reement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights.9 
The W1PO Report suggested that the uniform administrative dis-
pute resolution mechanism be Internet-based.98 The report also pro-
vided that this process be modeled after Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) proceedings.99 This ADR-like proceeding would 
determine the rights of parties to domain name disputes involving 
89. WIPO Final Report, supra note 1,1 18; see also Hestermeyer, supra note 48, at 
14. 
90. Froomkin, supra note 54, at 622-23. 
91. [d., at 623. 
92. Hestermeyer, supra note 48, at 14. 
93. [d. 
94. Froomkin, supra note 54, at 623. 
95. [d. 
96. Hestermeyer, supra note 48, at 17. 
97. [d. 
98. [d., at 18. 
99. [d. 
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supposed violations of intellectual property rights. lOO The WIPO Re-
port further proposed that remedies be limited to canceling or trans-
ferring ownership of a domain name, and would not preclude 
litigation or a de novo review of the decision. 101 Ultimately, decisions 
by a court of competent jurisdiction would prevail over a differing 
decision from an ADR determination.102 
D. The Creation oj the UDRP 
InJuly 1998, WIPO undertook an extensive international consulta-
tion termed "the WIPO Process" to make domain name recommenda-
tions to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
("ICANN").I03 ICANN served as the nonprofit, private U.S. corpora-
tion established to manage the domain name system by approving pol-
icies and measures for handling domain name disputes as well as 
accrediting of domain name registrars.104 ICANN was also charged 
with adopting procedures and policies for handling domain name dis-
putes via an administrative process.105 In April 1999, WIPO delivered 
its "Final Report" to ICANN. 106 
Although WIPO's Final Report proposed an ADR process (the 
UDRP), it carefully provided that this process "should not deny access 
to litigation or have a mandatory value as precedent for national 
courts whose decisions prevail in case of conflict with outcomes of ... 
ADR proceeding[s]."107 In addition, WIPO did not view this ADR pro-
cess as equivalent to binding arbitration, instead providing that bind-
ing arbitration was only optiona1. 108 
Throughout this process, the general consensus discussed the impli-
cations of using trademarks as domain names. 109 The process recog-
nized that consumers may be misled about the source of a product or 
services when a trademark is used as a domain name and the trade-
mark owner did not consent to this use.110 If trademark owners could 
protect their rights only via expensive litigation, business owners 
would lack confidence in the Internet's ability to protect their trade-




103. WIPO Final Report, supra note 1, at v. 
104. Id.; see also Clark D. Robertson, Casenote, Carinthians Soccer Loses By Decision 
in Second Round Play-off over Carinthians.com in Sallen v. Corinthians 
Licenciamentos LTDA, 11 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. FORUM 49, 56 (2004). 
105. Robertson, supra note 104, at 56. 
106. See WIPO Final Report, supra note 1. 
107. Hestermeyer, supra note 48, at 19-20. 
108. Id., at 18. 
109. White Paper, supra note 1, at 31746. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
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ICANN implemented the UDRP in August 1999.112 Composed of 
the UDRP Policy itself, as well as a set of procedural rules, the UDRP 
became the administrative process for handling disputes involving do-
main names. ll3 The UDRPs power was derived from ICANN's juris-
diction over the regulation of domain namesY4 ICANN wielded this 
power because someone who acquires a domain name obtains the 
name from a registrar who received the right to offer names from an 
ICANN-approved domain name registry.115 
Under the UDRP, complainants can select a dispute administrator 
from among several administrators accredited by ICANN.116 The new 
policy provided that when a domain name is registered or an existing 
registration is renewed, the registering party "must agree to the UDRP 
in the registration agreement, otherwise they cannot register the do-
main name."1l7 
With this, the goal of providing a quick and inexpensive domain 
name dispute resolution option was born. Unfortunately, the promise 
of an especially efficient resolution for domain name disputes became 
more of a theory than a reality. 
III. THE UDRPS OWN PROVISIONS PREVENT IT FROM SERV-
ING AS AN EFFICIENT DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE 
MECHANISM 
The UDRPs inability to efficiently resolve domain name disputes is 
primarily self-inflicted. In particular, several provisions in the UDRP 
Rules, as well as the UDRP Policy itself, have essentially gutted the 
UDRPs efficiency for resolving these disputes. This section will ana-
lyze three provisions that most obviously provoke this inefficiency and 
conclude with a case study that illustrates this point. 
A. The UDRP Is Inefficient Because Its Own Provisions Undermine Its Pro-
fessed Mandatory Nature 
The UDRP plainly professes to require mandatory participation by a 
registrant, as signaled by the section heading "Mandatory Administra-
tive Proceeding."ll8 Specifically, the UDRP provides: "[t]his para-
graph sets forth the type of disputes for which you [the registrant] are 
required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding."ll9 
Clearly, the UDRP is designed to convince domain name registrants 
that participation in the dispute resolution process is mandatory. 
112. Robertson, supra note 104, at 57. 
113. Id. 
114. Froomkin, supra note 54, at 612. 
115. Id. 
116. Robertson, supra note 104, at 57. 
117. Id. 
118. UDRP, supra note 2, § 4. 
119. Id. (emphasis added). 
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The UDRPs mandatory nature arises from the fact that the policy is 
part of the standard domain name registration contract between a do-
main registrar and the registrant. 120 This means that any individual or 
entity that enters into a domain name registration contract (for a do-
main name within the scope of the UDRP21) also, whether wittingly or 
not, agrees to be subject to the UDRPs terms. 122 
The UDRPs mandatory participation requirement results solely 
from this contract, therefore, the UDRP can only be enforced against 
parties to contract. In other words, the UDRP cannot require prospec-
tive complainants to participate in the UDRP dispute resolution pro-
cess because they are not a party to the domain name registration 
contract at issue. 
The practical result is that, because a complainant is not a party to 
the contract but the domain name registrant is, a complainant who 
files a UDRP action can force a registrant to participate in a mandatory 
UDRP proceeding, but the registrant cannot do the saine to the com-
plainant.123 This represents the most obvious difference between 
traditional binding arbitration and the UDRP. in traditional arbitra-
tion, the contract mandating arbitration is between the disputing par-
ties whereas, in the UDRP, one of the disputing parties is not even a 
party to the agreement that requires arbitration. 
The fact that a prospective complainant is never a party to the do-
main name registration contract does not abrogate the alleged 
mandatory nature of the UDRP, even though the UDRPs mandatory 
nature is clearly and completely one-sided. Despite purporting to 
mandate participation by registrants, other provisions undermine 
mandatory participation by essentially relieving the domain name reg-
istrants from mandatory participation.124 This scenario reduces any 
real semblance of mandatory participation, which gravely affects the 
UDRPs ability to serve as a cost effective and time efficient alternative 
to traditional litigation.125 The following subsections explore the ra-
tionale behind the uniform decisions by U.S. courts to adopt a de 
novo standard of review for UDRP cases. 
120. Annette Kur, UDRP, MAx-PLANCK INST. for FOREIGN & INT'L PAT., Copy-
RIGHT & COMPETITION L. 12 (2002), at http://www.intellecprop.mpg.de/ 
Online-Publikationen/2002/UDRP-study-final-02.pdf. 
121. See id. Not all domain names are subject to the UDRP. See WIPO Final Re-
port, supra note 1, ~ 43. Instead, only gTLDs and those ccTLDs that volun-
tarily adopt the UDRP fall within the purview of the UDRP. Id., ~ 43. 
122. See Kur, supra note 121, at 12. 
123. This primarily means that a domain name registrant's request for a finding 
that a complainant engaged in reverse cyber-squatting carries no substan-
tive weight. See WIPO Final Report, supra note 1, ~ 43. This is because the 
non-domain name registrant cannot be held accountable for such conduct 
since the non-domain name registrant is not a party to the domain name 
registration contract. See id., ~ 43. 
124. UDRP, supra note 2, §§ 4(k), 5. 
125. See WIPO Final Report, supra note 1, ~ 158. 
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1. A Domain Name Registrant's Ability to Circumvent, or Even Com-
pletely Avoid, Mandatory Participation in the UDRP Undermines 
the Efficiency of the UDRP 
The UDRP professes to be a mandatory proceeding for domain 
name registrants;126 however, at nearly any stage of a UDRP proceed-
ing, a domain name registrant can simply opt out of participation.127 
For example, the section entitled "Availability of Court Proceedings" 
reveals that participation by domain name registrants is not 
mandatory. Before a UDRP panel decision is implemented, the regis-
trant can essentially short-circuit the UDRP proceeding by filing a 
court action."128 Procedurally, this provision enables a domain name 
registrant to avoid the entire "mandatory" UDRP process by simply fil-
ing a court action (most likely a declaratory relief action) "before such 
mandatory administrative proceeding is commenced."129 The regis-
trant can easily avoid participation in the UDRP proceeding-even if 
the complainant has invested time and expense in preparing the 
UDRP complaint. 130 Such a scenario hardly promotes the UDRPs pri-
mary goal of efficiency. Instead, it discourages complainants from in-
vesting even the comparatively small amount of time and money 
needed to prepare and file a UDRP action. 
Revising this section to eliminate the domain name registrant's 
right to file a court action would eliminate this disincentive and estab-
lish a system that actually mandates participation by the domain name 
registrant in practice rather than just in name.131 As is, this provision 
undermines mandatory participation by the domain name registrant 
that, in tum, undermines the UDRPs ability to serve as a cost and time 
efficient domain name dispute alternative. 
Even more troubling, the UDRPs language essentially empowers a 
domain name registrant to circumvent a UDRP action-even after the 
complaint is filed. 132 Specifically, Section 18 contemplates the filing of 
legal proceedings not only before the complainant files a UDRP action 
but also during the UDRP action. 133 As a result, a complainant can 
prepare a complaint, pay the UDRP filing fee, and prosecute an ac-
126. UDRP, supra note 2, § 4. 
127. See id. §§ 4(k), 5. 
128. [d. § 4(k). "The mandatory administrative proceeding requirements set 
forth in Paragraph 4 shall not prevent either you [the registrant] or the 
complainant from submitting the dispute to a court of competent jurisdic-
tion for independent resolution before such mandatory administrative pro-
ceeding is commenced or after such a proceeding is concluded." [d. 
(emphasis added). 
129. [d. 
130. [d. §§ 4(g), (k). 
13l. [d. § 4. 
132. See Rules, supra note 2, § 18(a). 
133. [d. 
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tion, only to have that time and expense wasted if the domain name 
registrant files a lawsuit before the UDRP panel issues its decision. 
Under this scenario, a complainant would better serve his or her 
cause by filing a court action from the onset. Although, Section 18 
provides a UDRP panel the discretion to "proceed to a decision" even 
if a lawsuit is filed,I34 in practice, it makes little sense for a UDRP panel 
to do so. As discussed later, courts generally give no deference to 
UDRP panel decisions. 135 
If the UDRP truly was a mandatory proceeding for domain name 
registrants, why would its drafters permit a domain name registrant to 
undermine the process by filing a lawsuit before or during the dis-
pute? Clearly, a domain name registrant's ability to pursue relief be-
yond the UDRP belies the claim of mandatory participation. 
2. Post-Decision Rights That the UDRP Affords to Registrants Under-
mines the Efficiency of the UDRP 
The registrant's ability to circumvent mandatory participation by fil-
ing a court action reduces the UDRPs ability to serve as a less expen-
sive and time-consuming dispute resolution option. 136 Those 
provisions could be termed the registrant's "Pre-Decision" rights. 
Unfortunately, the UDRPs provisions also afford 'domain name reg-
istrants "Post-Decision" rights that further undermine the UDRP be-
cause a domain name registrant can, for all practical purposes, 
completely ignore a UDRP complaint filed against him or her. 137 Even 
if the UDRP panel orders the transfer or cancellation of a domain 
name, the registrant need only file an independent court action 
within ten days of the panel's decision to render the entire panel pro-
cess moot and unenforceable. 138 This presents a real credibility prob-
lem for the UDRP. Though the UDRPclaims to be "mandatory"-and 
in fact provides for relief in the form of a domain name transfer or 
cancellationl39-there is little incentive for investing time or money in 
the UDRP action once it becomes clear that the registrant will contest 
the matter because the registrant can easily render the UDRP ruling 
useless by filing a court action within the prescribed time.140 
Even more damning is the fact that U.S. courts consistently refuse 
to defer to the UDRP process, even when the registrant actively partici-
pates in the UDRP action but later contests the UDRPs ruling in 
134. [d. 
135. See infra Part III.B.; see also Weber-Stephens Prods. Co. v. Armitage Hard-
ware & Bldg. Supply, Inc., No. 00C1738, 2000 WL 562470, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
May 3, 2000). 
136. UDRP, supra note 2, § 4(k); see also WIPO Final Report, supra note 1, 1[ 158. 
137. UDRP, supra note 2, § 4(k). 
138. [d. 
139. [d. § 3. 
140. [d. § 4(k). 
2004] Wasting Time in Cyberspace 175 
court.141 This leads to the second major inefficiency: courts generally 
review UDRP decisions de novo. 
B. The UDRP Is Inefficient Because U.S. Courts Generally Do Not Afford 
UDRP Decisions Any Deference 
One of the guiding principles in the Initial WIPO Report was the 
need for an expedited process designed to reduce the time and ex-
pense of domain name disputes: "[t]he procedure should permit the 
parties to resolve a dispute expeditiously and at a low cost."142 Be-
cause the Internet is a fast-changing medium, an expedited and inex-
pensive UDRP process would be an advantage over lengthy and 
expensive court litigation. 143 
While recognizing the desirability of these traits, the Initial WIPO 
Report was equally committed to the proposition that parties be able 
to forgo the UDRP and seek relief in court. l44 The report was con-
vinced that "a party should be free to initiate litigation by filing a 
claim in a competent national court instead of initiating the adminis-
trative procedure."145 This resolve was based on "a natural level of 
discomfort in placing complete trust in a system which is new and 
which has the capacity to affect valued rights."146 
To accomplish this goal, the Initial WIPO Report suggested that the 
UDRP process be distinctly different from mandatory and binding ar-
bitration.147 This suggestion was based on the fact that, in many coun-
tries, an agreement to submit to binding arbitration is essentially an 
agreement to abandon one's right to litigate a matter in court.148 
Therefore, where the UDRPprocess is treated as a mandatory, binding 
arbitration process, it would preclude a party from later seeking court 
relief. 
On one level, this suggestion makes sense: limiting a party's redress 
to a new and unproven dispute mechanism could lead to unsuspected 
prejudice if the new mechanism turned out to be flawed. 149 However, 










See Retail Servs., Inc. v. Freebies Publ'g, 247 F. Supp. 2d 822, 827-28 (E.D. 
Va.2003). 
WIPO Final Report, supra note 1,1 IS0(i}. 
Id.,l 148. 
Id., 11 IS0(iv}. 
Id. 
Id., 11 133, (noting that "[t]here has been, in consequence, in some 
quarters, a reluctance to abandon all possibilities of resort to litigation as a 
result of the adoption of new procedures, at least in the first stage before 
experience of a new system"). 
Id., 11 ISO (iv). 
Id., 11 138. 
This suggestion allows the UDRP to avoid the thorny issue of forcing a non-
domain name registrant to relinquish the right to litigate in court when the 
non-domain name registrant was not a party to the domain name registra-
tion contract that implements the UDRP. 
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ultimately works against the UDRPs goal of establishing a quick and 
inexpensive resolution mechanism. 150 This occurs because a domain 
name registrant can simply ignore a UDRP action filed against it; even 
if the registrant is the most incorrigible of cyber-squatters, a registrant 
need only file a court action within ten days of the UDRP decision to 
render that decision essentially meaningless. 151 
Worse still, this "appeal"IS2 exacerbates the inefficiencies because 
U.S. courts generally have not deferred to the findings or holdings of 
a UDRP panel. 153 The issue was first addressed in Weber-Stephen Prods. 
Co. v. Armitage Hardware & Bldg. Supply, Inc.,Is4 where the court held: 
[T] his Court is not bound by the outcome of the ICANN 
administrative proceedings. But at this time we decline to 
determine the precise standard by which we would review 
the panel's decision, and what degree of deference (if any) 
we would give that decision. Neither the ICANN Policy nor 
its governing rules dictate to courts what weight should be 
given to a panel's decision, and the WIPO e-mail message 
stating that "a court may give appropriate weight to the Ad-
ministrative Panel's decision" confirms the breadth of our 
discretion. ISS 
The finding in Weber-Stephen that courts should not defer to UDRP de-
cisions and, instead, review them de novo, began a trend followed by 
other federal courts. Courts have consistently stated that UDRP deci-
sions should receive no deference. ls6 Recently, in Barcelona.com, Inc. 
v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona,IS7 the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals offered some of the strongest language to date against 
deference: 
[I]ndeed the WIPO panelist's decision is not even entitled to 
deference on the merits. A brief review of the scheme estab-
lished by ICANN in adopting the UDRP and by Congress in 
enacting the ACPA informs our resolution of this issue. 
Moreover, any decision made by a panel under the UDRP is 
no more than an agreed-upon administration that is not 
150. WIPO Final Report, supra note 1,1 150(i). 
151. UDRP, supra note 2, § 4(k). 
152. The UDRP does not specifically provide for an appeal. However, by al-
lowing the losing party to prevent the implementation of a UDRP panel 
decision by filing a court action within the prescribed time, the UDRP es-
sentially creates the opportunity for appellate review though it is not called 
as such. See id. 
153. See Parisi v. NetLearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 652 (E.D. Va. 2001). 
154. No. 00C1738, 2000 WL 562470 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2000). "No federal court 
has yet considered the legal effect of a WIPO proceeding." Id. at *1. 
155. Id. at *2. 
156. Bord v. Banco de Chile, 205 F. Supp. 2d 521, 523 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
157. 330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2003). 
2004] Wasting Time in Cyberspace 
given any deference under the ACPA. To the contrary, be-
cause a UDRP decision is susceptible of being grounded on 
principles foreign or hostile to American law, the ACPA au-
thorizes reversing a panel decision if such a result is called 
for by application of the Lanham Act. . . . 
... Moreover, we give the decision of the WIPO panelist no 
deference in deciding this action .... 158 
177 
While possibly more direct than other courts, the Fourth Circuit's 
refusal to defer comports with other U.S. court decisions. When 
courts reach such a uniform conclusion on a relatively new legal issue, 
it is often instructive to consider whether the reasoning supporting 
these conclusions is uniform or disjointed. U.S. courts have generally 
relied on two distinct, yet common, findings in concluding that UDRP 
decisions should receive no deference. The following subsections ex-
plore these rationales. 
l. The UDRP Is Distinct from Arbitration Agreements Subject to the 
Federal Arbitration Act 
In concluding that UDRP decisions should not be afforded defer-
ence, courts considered whether UDRPactions are analogous to bind-
ing arbitration proceedings. In doing so, the courts concluded that 
UDRP decisions, although similar to binding arbitration, are not 
equivalent. 159 
One of the first cases to consider this issue was Parisi v. NetLeaming, 
Inc. 160 In Parisi, the defendant NetLeaming (who prevailed in a 
UDRP decision against Parisi that precipitated the lawsuit at issue) ar-
gued that the UDRP was arbitration within the scope of the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA).161 NetLeaming based this argument on a pro-
vision in the FAA that defines the types of proceedings subject to the 
Act: 
[a] written provision in any ... contract evidencing a transac-
tion involving commerce to settle by arbitration a contro-
versy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, 
158. [d. at 623, 626. 
159. See Parisi, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 751-52. For that matter, even the UDRP panel 
is not sure how UDRP proceedings should be classified. See Hewlett-Pack-
ard Co. v. Jeff Burgar, Nat'l Arb. Forum 0002000093564 (Apr. 10, 2000) 
(Froomkin, Arb., dissenting) ("I agree with the majority that this panel, 
whether viewed as engaged in an international arbitration or an administra-
tive procedure, has both the power and the duty to determine whether it 
has jurisdiction."). 
160. 139 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Va. 2001). 
161. See NetLearning, Inc.'s Reply Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss at 2, 
Parisi v. NetLearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Va. 2001) (No. 00-
1823-A). A detailed case study of the NetLeaming, Inc., v. Parisi UDRP and 
federal court proceedings is found in Section N of this article. 
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or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an 
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing 
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or re-
fusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract. 162 
Based on this language, NetLearning argued: 
[T]o be considered [an] arbitration provision, only three el-
ements are required: (1) a contract; (2) which evidences a 
transaction involving commerce; (3) which is designed to set-
tle a controversy by arbitration. In this case, a comparison of 
the UDRP and the Federal Arbitration Action clearly reveals 
that the UDRP satisfies these elements and, thus, constitutes 
an arbitration provision.163 
NetLearning argued that Parisi's agreement with a domain name reg-
istrar represented a contract; his payment of registration fees evi-
denced a commerce-based transaction; and, the presence of the UDRP 
within the domain name registration agreement was designed to settle 
a controversy in an arbitrable format. 164 
While recognizing that the UDRP represented a "contract-based 
scheme for addressing disputes between domain name registrants and 
third parties challenging the registration and use of their domain 
names," the Parisi court concluded that the UDRP was not subject to 
the FAA.165 The court reasoned that the UDRPs "unique contractual 
arrangement" was inconsistent with judicial review standards under 
the FAA.166 
In reaching its decision, the Parisi court cited four factors that dis-
tinguished the UDRP from an arbitration agreement subject to the 
FAA.167 First, the court concluded that the UDRPs provision for par-
allel UDRP and court litigation obviated the FAA's provision for the 
staying of litigation during an arbitration proceeding. 168 Second, the 
UDRP could not be considered compelled arbitration subject to the 
FAA because a UDRP complainant is not a party to the contract be-
tween the domain name registrant and the registrar. 169 Third, the 
UDRP does not satisfy the FAA's requirement that the parties to an 
arbitration agree that a court judgment shall be entered upon the ar-
162. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.CA § 2 (1999). 
163. See NetLeaming Inc.'s Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 2-3, 
Parisi v. NetLearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Va. 2001) (No. 00-
1823-A). 
164. [d. at 3. 
165. Parisi, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 75l. 
166. [d. 
167. [d. at 751-52. 
168. [d. at 75l. 
169. [d. 
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bitrator's ruling. l7O Finally, the Parisi court noted that the UDRP 
neither contemplated nor fostered the deference normally contem-
plated for a binding arbitration: "[t]he UDRPs contemplation of par-
allel litigation and abbreviated proceedings does not invite such 
deference."171 
Based on these distinctions, the Parisi court concluded that, while 
analogous to an arbitration agreement, the UDRP nevertheless lacked 
certain traditional characteristics of binding arbitration, thereby re-
moving the UDRP (and appeals of UDRP decisions) from governance 
under the FAA. 1 72 
In Dluhos v. Strasberg, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals also consid-
ered whether a court's review of a UDRP decision was subject to the 
FAA.173 Similar to the result in Parisi, the Dluhos court answered no to 
that question.174 In reasoning very similar to that of Parisi, the Dluhos 
court based its holding on the fact that the UDRP was never designed 
to replace court actions, but only to provide an alternative. 175 The 
Dluhos court concluded that treating a UDRP decision as a type of 
binding arbitration governed by the FAA would frustrate the UDRPs 
original design.176 The court compared this to trying to force a 
"square-peg UDRP proceeding into the round hole of the Federal Ar-
bitration ACt."l77 The significance of these rulings (and the underly-
ing reason why NetLearning offered this argument in the first place) 
is best appreciated by considering the effect of subjecting the UDRP to 
the FAA. 
2. u.S. Courts Have Generally Afforded Great Deference to the 
Holdings of Arbitration Proceedings Subject to the Federal Arbi-
tration Act 
Similar to the goals of the UDRP, arbitration proceedings were es-
tablished to create a dispute resolution mechanism for legal conflicts 
that was faster, less expensive, and less formal than ordinary court pro-
ceedings. 178 Because of this goal, courts are reticent to vacate or mod-
ify arbitration decisions. There is a presumption of upholding the 
170. Id. at 752. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 753. 
173. 321 F.3d 365 (3d Cir. 2003). 
174. Id. at 372-73. 
175. Id. at 371. 
176. Id. at 372. 
177. Id. at 372; see also Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 
26-27 (1st Cir. 2001). 
178. 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Disp. Resol. § 8 (2004); see also Apex Plumbing Sup-
ply, Inc. v. U.S. Supply Co., 142 F.3d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating "the 
purpose of having arbitration at all [is] the quick resolution of disputes and 
the avoidance of the expense and delay associated with litigation"). 
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arbitrator's decision-even though it is an extrajudicial creature-be-
cause the law favors the benefits of arbitration. 179 
The FAA governs the vast majority of arbitrations. ISO In doing so, it 
affords great deference to an arbitrator's decision. lSI Thus, arbitra-
tors are given broad discretion and authority: "[AJny doubts concern-
ing the scope of arbitrable issues, as well as any doubts concerning the 
scope of the arbitrators' remedial authority, are to be resolved in favor 
of the arbitrators' authority as a matter of federal law and policy."Is2 
To codify the policy decision of broad arbitrator discretion, the FAA 
narrowly restricts a court's authority to overturn an arbitration deci-
sion. IS3 These limited circumstances include: 1) when an arbitration 
decision is obtained through "corruption, fraud, or undue means;" 2) 
when there is evidence of "partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, 
or either of them;" 3) when an arbitrator ignores reasonable requests 
to postpone an arbitration, when an arbitrator ignores "evidence per-
tinent and material to the controversy," when an arbitrator engages in 
any other prejudicial "misbehavior;" or, lastly and most generally; 4) 
when "the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly exe-
cuted them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made."ls4 
The practical effect of broad deference is that a court cannot vacate 
an award-even if it disagrees with an arbitrator's factual findings or 
legal conclusions-as long as the decision comports with the F AA.ls5 
This approach enables binding arbitration to truly be binding in most 
instances. That, in turn, allows the majority of parties to obtain a reso-
lution in a faster, less expensive, and less formal manner-all goals 
that arbitration shares with the UDRP in name but not in practice. 1S6 
Unfortunately, the UDRP was not structured as a binding dispute 
resolution mechanism, so the FAA's finality is absent in UDRP pro-
ceedings.1s7 As a result, a complainant who enters a UDRP proceed-
ing lacks the certainty that his or her dispute will be resolved, as 
179. Apex Plumbing, 142 F.3d at 193. 
180. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (applying any maritime or commercial transaction 
involving arbitration); see also William P. Byrne, The Effect of RICO on Mari-
time Arbitration, 12 TuL. MAR. LJ. 77, 78 (1987) (noting that "[t]he Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) governs most agreements to arbitrate commercial 
disputes") . 
181. See Apex Plumbing, 142 F.3d at 193 (finding that the "[r]eview of an arbitra-
tor's award is severely circumscribed"); Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monu-
mental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141, 145 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that "[g]reat 
deference is given to arbitration awards"). 
182. Peoples Sec., 991 F.2d at 147 (quoting Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. 
Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353,358 (N.D. Ala. 1984)). 
183. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000). 
184. Id. 
185. See Peoples Sec., 991 F.2d at 145. 
186. See supra Part II.D. 
187. See supra Part II.D. 
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compared with a complainant in a binding arbitration under the 
FAA. 188 
One response to this reasoning is that a complainant who files a 
court action also lacks the finality of a binding arbitration because a 
court action also may be appealed. While true in one context, this 
argument misses the big picture. If a complainant in a domain name 
dispute proceeded directly to court and bypassed the UDRP, that com-
plainant would be one step closer to final appellate review-ultimately 
where true finality resides. In this respect, because courts have de-
cided not to afford UDRP decisions deference, it is essentially a non-
binding proceeding. As the following section demonstrates, the 
reason courts have not deferred is that the UDRPs own provisions and 
history provides for de novo review. 
3. The UDRPs "Legislative History" Suggests That Courts Should 
Use a De Novo Standard When Reviewing UDRP Decisions 
The conclusion by U.S. courts that UDRP decisions should be re-
viewed de novo does not simply result from the court's own analysis of 
the UDRP.189 Rather, the WIPO Final Report-which essentially 
amounts to the UDRPs "legislative history"-recommends de novo re-
view. 190 Unfortunately, neither the UDRP nor its "legislative history" 
provides much specific insight into why the UDRP drafters believed 
courts should not afford deference on review. The UDRPs discomfort 
with allowing its decisions to bind courts appears centered on the 
multi-national nature of UDRP proceedings and the likely nuances 
among international legal systems.191 In particular, the WIPO Final 
Report explained: 
The multijurisdictional and multifunctional nature of the In-
ternet mean that, inevitably, many different interests in many 
different parts of the world will be concerned with any en-
deavor to formulate specific policies. Special care needs to 
be exercised to ensure that any policy developed for one in-
terest or function does not impact undul~ on, or interfere 
unduly with, other interests or functions. 1 2 
Because the UDRP aspires to resolve global disputes,193 adopting an 
American or even Westernized legal model carte blanche is inappropri-
ate. Nevertheless, the UDRPs Final Report found that arbitration has 
broad support worldwide as a method for resolving disputes.194 For 
example, the Final Report noted that more than 100 countries have 
188. See supra Part liLA. 
189. See WIPO Final Report, supra note 1, ~ 150(iv). 
190. /d. 
191. /d., ~ 150(v). 
192. /d., ~ 3. 
193. See id., Preamble. 
194. Id., ~ 138. 
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embraced binding arbitration, either through their own laws or by be-
coming a party to the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958.195 Thus, adopting a 
binding arbitration model clearly would not have placed the UDRP in 
the waters of unknown or untested legal thought or procedure. Nev-
ertheless, even though binding arbitration is widely accepted, the 
UDRP drafters seemed determined to require de novo review and thus 
avoid a binding nature. 196 
The WIPO Final Report did at least leave open some doors for an-
other approach in the future. For example, the WIPO Final Report 
stated that nonbinding arbitration was appropriate "at least in the ini-
tial stage of the new management of the DNS," the implication being 
that binding arbitration might be appropriate at a later stage.197 
Moreover, the WIPO Final Report "hoped" its decisions would de-
velop its own body of law so that UDRP participants would one day 
resist court review. 198 
However, any chance for this "hope" to be realized is undercut by 
the UDRPs stated fear of adopting a binding nature. 199 As de novo 
court review is available, there is little incentive for a losing party to 
submit to the UDRP decision when a reviewing court is not bound by 
any ofthe UDRPs factual findings or legal conclusions.20o The "hope" 
of a consistent and credible body of law is merely an altruistic reason 
to forgo a potentially better result upon court review. 
No doubt the creators of the UDRPwanted it to serve as an efficient 
arbiter of domain name disputes. 201 However, the UDRPs own refusal 
to structure itself in the model of a binding arbitration proceeding 
undermines this goal. The fact that its legislative history argues 
against legal deference is just another example of the UDRPs conflict-
ing desires. Ultimately, this undercuts the UDRPs ability to serve as 
an efficient dispute resolution mechanism for contested disputes. 
C. The UDRP Is Inefficient Because It Permits the Possibility oj an Unlim-
ited Number oj Supplemental Filings 
As will be demonstrated in the following case study, drafters of the 
UDRP made a threshold decision that further damaged efforts to re-
duce time and cost. Specifically, the UDRP allowed dispute resolution 




198. See id., 11 IS3 (stating that "[i]t is to be hoped, however, that with experi-
ence and time, confidence will be built up in the credibility and consistency 
of decisions made under the procedure, so that the parties would resort less 
and less to litigation."). 
199. See id., 11 IS0(iv). 
200. See id. 
201. See, e.g., id., 11 IS0(i)-(ii). 
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ings beyond the UDRP complaint and answer.202 According to one 
staff report, the UDRP opted not to define standards for supplemental 
filings in order to accommodate language differences: 
The posted rules of procedure provided for limits on the 
length of complaints and responses filed in the administra-
tive dispute-resolution procedure. They al50 provided for length 
guidelines for decisions and dissenting opinions. However, the lim-
its were left blank and comments invited. A few comments were re-
ceived, but there was divergence in the lengths proposed by the 
commentators. Staff recommends that the limits and guidelines be 
established by each dispute-resolution provider's supplemental 
rules. 203 
Ceding the decision to individual dispute resolution providers was 
rooted in the WIPO Final Report.204 Specifically, UDRPcreators made 
a threshold decision to give dispute resolution providers broad discre-
tion in administering UDRP actions, including discretion on the num-
ber of supplemental filings.205 
In response, UDRP dispute resolution providers decided not to ex-
pressly limit the length or number of supplemental filings by parties 
to a UDRP action. 206 Instead, UDRP complainants and respondents 
may file an unrestricted number of supplemental pleadings and, at 
least under the National Arbitration Forum's (NAF) Supplemental 
Rules, supplemental pleadings may have an unlimited number of 
pages and exhibits, annexes, attachments, or the equivalent.207 Fail-
ing to restrain the number of additional pleadings creates an incen-







See ICANN, Second Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform 
Dispute Resolution Policy, 1 1.4 at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-second-
staff-report-24oct99.htm (last modified Oct. 25, 1999) [hereinafter Second 
Report]; see also Rules, supra note 2, §§ 10, 12. 
See Second Report, supra note 205, at 1 4.14 (emphasis added). 
See The Management of Internet names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues, 
Annex V: Rules for Administrative Procedure Concerning Abusive Domain Name 
Registrations [hereinafter Annex V], arts. 21-22, available at http://arbiter. 
wipo.int/processes/processl/report/doc/annex05.doc (last visited Feb. 
05, 2005). 
Annex V, supra note 207, arts. 21, 23. In particular, article 21 provides that 
"[s]ubject to these Rules, the Panel may conduct the proceedings in such 
manner as it considers appropriate." Id. at art. 21. Article 23 further pro-
vides that "[t]he Panel may, in its discretion, allow or require further state-
ments from the Parties." Id. at art. 23. 
See National Arbitration Forum UDRP Supplemental Rules [hereinafter NAF's 
Supplemental Rules], R. 7, at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/UDRP/ 
rules.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2005); see also World Intellectual Property Organi-
zation Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at 
http://arbiter.wipo.int/ domains/rules/supplemental/index.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 05, 2005) [hereinafter WIPO Supplemental Rules]. 
See NAF's Supplemental Rules, supra note 209, R. 7. 
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getting the last word, and responding to the opposition's attempts to 
do the same. 
One obvious side effect is that legal fees will increase with every 
additional pleading. Ultimately, the policy of unlimited supplemental 
pleadings often serves to increase legal fees for prosecuting or defend-
ing a UDRP claim, which direcdy contradicts the UDRPs purpose. 
The potential for abuse is more than theoretical, as the following 
case study demonstrates. Indeed, this is just one lesson learned from 
the Parisi v. NetLearning matter-an excellent case demonstrating why 
the UDRP can be an inefficient option for domain name disputes. 
IV. PARISI V. NETLEARNING: HOW THE UDRP FAILED ITS 
GOALS 
Pointing out the UDRPs structural flaws is more instructive when 
illustrated by an actual dispute. This section provides an in-depth 
analysis of the domain name dispute between Dan Parisi and 
NetLearning, Inc.208 in order to demonstrate the UDRPs flaws. 
A. The Somewhat Strange Events Which Led to the Parisi v. NetLearning 
Dispute 
The origins of the dispute between Parisi and NetLearning seemed 
innocuous enough. On April 1, 1996, Parisi filed a federal "'intent to 
use' service mark application for the [service mark] 'Nedearning'.''209 
Approximately one month later, Parisi registered at least eighteen dif-
ferent domain names with Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI), including 
netlearning.com, for two-year terms at a cost of approximately fIfty 
dollars per domain name.210 The registered domain names covered a 
range of areas, including sports-related and medical-related domain 
names.211 When Parisi registered these domain names, he admitted 
that he did not have any corporate, fInancing, or other business plans 
for these domain names, including the nedearning.com domain 
name.212 
Notably, the May 1996 nedearning.com registration was not the 
only time Parisi registered the nedearning.com domain name. InJuly 
1998, Parisi registered the netlearning.com domain name a second 
208. See Parisi v. NetLearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 743 (E.D. Va. 2001). 
209. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Judgment on the Pleadings at 2, Ex. A, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (on file with 
author). 
210. See Deposition of Dan Parisi at 61,67, dep. exs. 1,3 (No. 00-1823-A) (on file 
with author). 
211. See id. at 67, dep. ex. 3. 
212. [d. at 78, 91-92. In fact, Parisi admitted that the netlearning.com domain 
name had never generated any revenue for him, had never had any adver-
tisers, and was never a subscription-based website. [d. at 78-79. 
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time for thirty five dollars and a one-year term.213 In April 1999, Parisi 
registered netlearning.com a third time, again for thirty five dollars 
and a one-year term.214 In April 2000, Parisi registered netlearning. 
com a fourth time, yet again for thirty five dollars and a one-year 
term.215 Finally, in April 2001, Parisi registered the netlearning.com 
domain name a fifth time.216 
In April 1997, the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) sent Parisi an office action letter denying his NetLearning 
service mark application for a variety of reasons, including a likeli-
hood of confusion with the existing registered mark LEARNNET.217 
Parisi did not respond to the letter and, as a result, the USPTO classi-
fied the application as abandoned.218 
Around this same time, NetLearning, Inc., a Knoxville, Tennessee-
based company that provides computer-based education products and 
services to hospitals, medical groups, and other health care profes-
sionals, contacted Parisi regarding a possible purchase of Parisi's net 
learning. com domain name.219 NetLearning inquired because it did 
business under the trade name NetLearning, Inc. and had begun to 
acquire customers and market goodwill with respect to that trade 
name.220 NetLearning believed obtaining the domain name would be 
fairly straightforward because "the domain name was not tied to any 
web server ... and was not operating with an active web page."221 
Unfortunately for NetLearning, this would end up being a time-con-
suming and litigation-fee-incurring mistake. 
Mter several discussions between the parties, Parisi advised 
NetLearning that he would not sell netlearning.com for less than 
213. See id. at 69, dep. ex. 4. 
214. See id. at 69-70, dep. ex. 5. 
215. See id. at 70, dep. ex. 6. 
216. See id. at 70 (Parisi could not recall specifically renewing in 2001, but be-
lieves that he always renewed his registration when required to keep it 
active). 
217. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Judgment on the Pleadings at 3, ex. F, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (on file 
with author). 
218. See id. at 3, ex. B (on file with author). Interestingly, in April 2000, 
NetLearning filed a federal service mark application for a design that also 
included the term "Netlearning" (appended with the slogan "The Ultimate 
Learning System"). Id. at 4, ex. G (on file with author). Following a United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) letter initially denying its ap-
plication, NetLearning made several modifications to its application, in-
cluding disclaiming an exclusive use of the term "Netlearning" apart from 
the mark as shown. Id. at 5, ex. K (on file with author). In light of these 
changes, the USPTO approved NetLearning's service mark application and 
registered it on the Principal Register (U.S. Registration No. 2487160). Id. 
at 5, ex. G (On file with author). 




186 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 34 
$25,000, despite the fact that this amount substantially exceeded Par-
isi's out-of-pocket expenses for the domain name, and netlearning. 
com was passively held by Parisi with no active web server or active web 
pages operating under that domain name.222 When NetLearning re-
fused to pay this price, Parisi connected the netlearning.com domain 
name to an active server and re-directed that domain name to another 
domain name that he had registered, whitehouse. com. 223 While it 
222. [d. at "2-3. The first e-mail between the parties occurred on May 7, 1997, 
when NetLearning's CEO John Morris wrote to Parisi: "I found your email 
address through InterNIC and saw that you have netlearning.com regis-
tered. I also noted that you do not have a WEB server tied to that Domain. 
Are you using the Domain? If you are or are not, please let me know. 
Thank you." E-mail from John Morris, CEO, NetLearning, to Dan Parisi, 
President, Infolook, Inc. (May 7, 1997, 16:45 EST) (on file with author). 
On March 10, 1998, John Morris sent an e-mail to Parisi in which he of-
fered "$500.00 for NetLearning and any associated trademarks, applica-
tions and domain names." E-mail fromJohnMorris.CEO.NetLearning.to 
Dan Parisi, President, Infolook, Inc. (March 10, 1998, 13:27 EST) (on file 
with author). NetLearning reiterated its desire to obtain this domain name 
in e-mails to Parisi dated June 29, 1998 and October 13, 1999, ultimately 
offering to pay Parisi $15,000 for the netlearning.com domain name. See E-
mail from John Morris, CEO, NetLearning, to Dan Parisi, President, In-
folook, Inc. (June 29, 1998, 15:19 EST); E-mail from John Morris, CEO, 
NetLearning, to Dan Parisi, President, Infolook, Inc. (Oct. 13, 1999, 13:53 
EST). On March 11,2000, Parisi wrote to John Morris indicating that he 
would accept no less than $25,000 for the domain name. E-mail from Dan 
Parisi, President, Infolook, Inc., to John Morris, CEO, NetLearning (March 
11, 2000, 16:49:06 EST) (on file with author). There is no record of any 
further e-mails between the parties following Parisi's March 11, 2000 e-mail. 
223. Declaration of John Morris at 'l[ 3, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A). NetLearning has 
not been the only party angered by Parisi's use of the whitehouse.com do-
main name. In fact, both the National Fruit Product Company and the 
United States White House have requested that Parisi cease and desist his 
operation of the whitehouse.com domain name as a clearinghouse for 
adult content. The National Fruit Product Company demanded that Parisi 
transfer rights in the whitehouse. com domain name to it based upon its use 
of a "White House" labeled apple cider since 1913. See Charles Cooper, 
Porn Site Squeezed fry Juice Maker, ZDNet News, at http://news.zdnet.com/ 
2100-9595_22-515555.html (Aug. 26, 1999) (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). The 
National Fruit Product Company seemed especially concerned that their 
"wholesome, family products" would be tarnished if somehow associated 
with the whitehouse. com website content. [d. 
Parisi's use of the whitehouse.com domain name also put him at odds 
with the White House in late 1997, when an attorney for then-President Bill 
Clinton sent Parisi a letter demanding that he cease and desist from his use 
of the whitehouse.com domain name as part of a deceptive scheme to lure 
internet users away from the website for the White House. See Letter from 
Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to President Clinton, to Dan Parisi, President, 
Infolook, Inc., available at http://news.com.com/2009-1023-207800.html? 
legacy=cnet (Dec.8, 1997) (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). 
In addition to the whitehouse. com disputes, several organizations have 
opposed Parisi for his registration of various "sucks. com" domain names, 
including Netscape Communications. See, e.g., Netscapesucks.com Ordered to 
Cease and Desist, at http://www.activewin.com/articles/netscape/article_l. 
shtml (Dec. 1, 1998) (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). The current New York City 
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might sound like the whitehouse. com web site was the online resi-
dence for the White House, in reality, it was an adult site, which con-
tained numerous pornographic images and other pornographic 
content.224 
Following Parisi's re-direction of the netlearning.com domain name 
to whitehouse. com, several existing and potential customers and in-
vestors of NetLearning attempted to access NetLearning's web site by 
entering the URL www.netlearning.com.225 Upon entering this URL, 
they were automatically re-directed to whitehouse. com and its porno-
graphic content.226 
Several NetLearning customers testified that the re-direc-
tion confused them as to whether NetLearning was affiliated 
with the whitehouse.com web site and its pornographic con-
tent.227 For example, Wayne Wood, the technical adminis-
trator for St. Mary's Hospital, a major customer of 
NetLearning, testified that when he typed in the URL net 
learning. com "[t]he first picture that I [saw] was Hillary Clin-
ton with black leather on. And then the second picture that 
I [saw] was [P]resident Clinton and Ross Perot in a hot tub 
with champagne with their shirts off."228 
Mr. Wood was shocked and concerned that NetLearning was affili-
ated with this content.229 As liaison for the NetLearning program at 
St. Mary's Hospital, Wood further testified that he handled various 
complaints from nurses and other employees who also were re-di-
rected to pornographic images after typing in netlearning.com.23o 
Similarly, Dr. Charles Lutz, an investor in NetLearning whose em-
ployer was also a customer, sought information regarding NetLearn-
ing by entering the URL with NetLearning's trade name.231 He, too, 
was automatically re-directed to the whitehouse. com website that con-
tained, among other content, doctored images of a former first lady 
engaged in sexual conduct with a dog.232 These images caused Dr. 
Lutz concern about his continued investment in NetLearning and his 
Mayor, Michael Bloomberg, objected to michaelbloombergsucks.com. See 
Amy Standen, The Saga of Sucks. com, at http://archive.salon.com/tech/fea 
turej2001j06/25/sucksj (June 25, 2001) (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). 
224. Declaration of John Morris at ~ 4, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A). 
225. [d. at ~ 5. 
226. [d. 
227. See Deposition of Wayne Wood at 7-12, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (on file with 
author). 
228. [d. at 8. 
229. [d. at 10-11. 
230. [d. at 12-14. 
231. See Deposition of Charles Lutz, M.D. at 7, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (on file 
with author). 
232. [d. at 7-8. 
188 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 34 
recommendation of NetLearning to his employer and other potential 
customers.233 
Realizing that Parisi's conduct was starting to affect its customers 
and investors, NetLearning filed a complaint under the UDRP against 
Parisi on August 21, 2000.234 Filed with the National Arbitration Fo-
rum, NetLearning alleged that Parisi had no interests or legitimate 
rights in the netlearning.com domain name, and that he registered 
and used it in bad faith.235 
On September 12, 2000, Parisi denied all allegations and accused 
NetLearning of reverse domain name hijacking.236 Under the UDRPs 
intended design as an expedient method for resolving disputes, Par-
isi's response might have been the final word before the UDRP panel 
issued its decision.237 
However, the NAF's supplemental rules permitted an unlimited 
number of "supplemental" pleadings as long as they were filed within 
five calendar days of the respondent's response. 23B As a .result, 
NetLearning filed a supplemental rebuttal statement on September 
233. Id. at 8-11. Apparently, other clients and investors of NetLearning also en-
countered Parisi's re-direction of the netlearning.com domain name to the 
whitehouse.com website. They were similarly confused "as to the location 
of NetLearning, Inc.'s website and the type of information which NetLearn-
ing, Inc. may sponsor, endorse or be affiliated with." Affidavit of Walter 
Cromer, NetLearning, Inc., v. Parisi, No. FA0008000095471 (Oct. 16,2000) 
(Merhige, Johnson & Sorkin, Arbs.); Affidavit of Pamela Etheridge, 
NetLearning, Inc. (No. FA0008000095471) (on file with author). 
234. See NetLearning's Domain Name Dispute Complaint Format 7, NetLearning, 
Inc. (No. FA0008000095471) (on file with author). 
235. Id. at 5-10. This was hardly Parisi's first brush with litigation arising out of 
his registration and use of domain names. Prior to the NetLearning mat-
ter, Parisi was involved in lawsuits with Dow Jones & Company, Inc. as well 
as EDGAROnline, Inc. over his registration of certain domain names. In 
the Dow Jones & Company matter, Dow Jones sued Parisi over his use of the 
wallstreetjournal.com domain name that Dow Jones claimed violated its 
rights in the registered trademark "The Wall StreetJournal." See Dow Jones 
& Co., Inc. v. WSJ Inc., No. 97-7690, 1998 WL 2370, at **1 (2d Cir. Jan. 6, 
1998). 
Parisi was also sued by EDGAROnline, a company that, among other things, 
compiles various corporate filings, who alleged that Parisi's registration of 
the edgaronline.com infringed on its service mark rights. See Edgar Online, 
Inc. v. Parisi, 4ILR (P & F) 8 (1999). 
236. See Dan Parisi's Response in Accordance with the Uniform Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy, NetLearning, Inc. (No. FA0008000095471) (on 
file with author). 
237. See WIPO Final Report, supra note 1, at 49. 
238. See The National Arbitration Furum's Supplemental Rules to ICANN's Uniform Do-
main Name Dispute Resolution Policy (Effective on or before October 1, 2000) [here-
inafter NAF's Supplemental Rules Pre-October 2000], R. 7, at http://www.arb 
forum.com/domains/UDRP/rules_100100.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2005) 
(this version of NAF's Supplemental Rules was in effect at the time of the 
filing of these complaints). 
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17, 2000,239 followed by a supplemental rebuttal response from Parisi 
on September 22, 2000.240 On September 26, 2000, the dispute ex-
perienced a flurry of filings with NetLearning submitting a third 
pleading, styled NetLearning's Objection to Respondent's Petition for 
Consideration,241 and Parisi submitted another pleading, this time 
styled Dan Parisi's Reply to NetLearning, Inc.'s Objection to Respon-
dent's Petition for Consideration.242 All in all, both parties filed six 
pleadings, totaling more than 100 pages in just over one month-
hardly the markings of a dispute resolution procedure designed to 
minimize legal costs.243 
On October 17, 2000, a three-member UDRP panel244 issued a 2-to-
1 decision in favor of NetLearning.245 The majority found that Parisi 
maintained no rights or legitimate interests in the netlearning.com 
domain name and he registered and used it in bad faith.246 The panel 
looked at both Parisi's actions and inactions in ruling against him: 
The record reflects that the Respondent linked the domain 
name to pornography sites or allowed the domain name to 
sit dormant. The fact is that the Respondent has not used 
the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of 
goods and services, is not commonly known by the domain 
239. See NetLearning Inc.'s Rebuttal Statement to Respondent's Uniform Do-
main Name Dispute Resolution Policy Response, NetLearning, Inc. (No. 
FA0008000095471) (on file with author). 
240. See Respondent's Reply to NetLearning, Inc.'s Rebuttal Statement to Re-
spondent's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy Response, 
NetLearning, Inc. (No. 00080000FA95471) (on file with author). 
241. See NetLearning's Objection to Respondent's Petition for Consideration 
(on file with author). 
242. See Respondent's Reply to NetLearning, Inc.'s Objection to Respondent'S 
Petition for Consideration, NetLearning, Inc. (No. 00080000FA95471) (on 
file with author). 
243. This is true even though the NAF charges parties $150.00 for each supple-
mental filing. See NAP's Supplemental Rules Pre-October 2000, supra note 241, 
at R. 7. 
244. Originally, NetLearning requested a single member panel. See NetLearn-
ing, Inc.'s Domain Name Dispute Complaint Form, NetLearning, Inc. (NO. 
0008000095471) (on file with author). The NAF charged a fee of $750.00 
for a single member panel. See NAP's Supplemental Rules Pre-October 2000, 
supra note 241, R. 16. However, Parisi responded to NetLeaming's com-
plaint by requesting a three-member panel. See Response in Accordance 
With the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy at 10, NetLearn-
ing, Inc. (No. 0008000095471) (on file with author). This increased the fee 
from $750.00 to $2,250.00. See NAP's Supplemental Rules Pre-October 2000, 
supra note 241, R. 16. 
245. See NetLearning, Inc., v. Parisi, No. FA0008000095471, pp. 5-6 (NAF Oct. 
16,2000) (Merhige,johnson & Sorkin, Arbs.), available at http://www.arb 
forum.com/ domains/ decisions/954 71.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2005) (on 
file with author). 
246. See id. at 4. 
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name, and has not used the domain name III connection 
with a noncommercial purpose.247 
The majority also concluded that Parisi registered and used the do-
main name in bad faith: 
A reasonable conclusion is that Respondent either in-
tended for commercial gain either directly from the refer-
ences to adult entertainment and/or pornographic material 
or as a bargaining tool in securing a higher price than had 
been offered by Complainant for the domain name in issue. 
However, it makes little difference as to Respondent's spe-
cific motive in his deliberate efforts-in any event it encom-
passed both embarrassment and harm to the Complainant. 
At the very least, it entailed the registration and use of the 
name in bad faith. 248 
The panel ordered Parisi to transfer the netlearning.com domain 
name to NetLearning, Inc.249 The dissenting member of the panel, 
David Sorkin, vigorously disagreed with the majority panel's decision, 
going so far as to accuse NetLearning of engaging in bad faith 
conduct.25o 
At this point, if the UDRP were truly an expedited domain name 
dispute resolution mechanism, the UDRP panel's decision would be 
binding, absent a finding of exceptional circumstances under which 
the FAA permits an arbitrator's decision to be overturned.251 How-
ever, this was not the case. The panel's decision was not the final 
word. Soon after the decision, Parisi filed a declaratory relief com-
plaint seeking to overturn the panel's order to transfer the domain 
name to NetLearning.252 
Even the filing of this lawsuit was a curious event. Parisi filed his 
original declaratory relief action on October 26, 2000253-within the 
ten-day deadline for filing a lawsuit to stay implementation of a UDRP 
panel decision.254 However, Parisi filed this lawsuit in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York.255 The 
247. [d. at 4. 
248. [d. at 5. While noting that Parisi claimed he never offered the netlearning. 
com name for sale to any third party, the majority panel "reject[ed] the 
accuracy" of that denial and, instead, found more persuasive the affidavit of 
NetLearning's CFO, Jon Russell, that he had personally seen Parisi list the 
netlearning.com domain name for sale on a third party website. [d. at 4. 
249. [d. at 5. 
250. [d. at 7 (Sorkin, Arb., dissenting). 
251. See 9 U.S.C. § lO (2000). 
252. See Original Parisi Declaratory Relief Complaint, Parisi v. NetLearning, Inc., 
139 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Va. 2001) (No.00-1823-A) (on file with author). 
253. See id. 
254. UDRP, supra note 2, § 4(k). 
255. See Original Parisi Declaratory Relief Complaint, Parisi (No. 00-1832-A) (on 
file with author). 
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problem was that the UDRP allows a complainant to select the exclu-
sive jurisdiction for actions arising out of the UDRP decision choosing 
between the location of the domain name registrar or the domain 
name registrant. 256 NetLearning selected the court jurisdiction where 
the registrar (in this case Network Solutions, Inc.) was located, North-
ern Virginia. 257 
As a result, Parisi had filed his action in the wrong court, thereby 
failing to comply with Section K, which stays implementation of a 
UDRP decision only when a lawsuit is filed in the proper jurisdiction-
with "proper" defined as the jurisdiction selected by the complain-
ant. 258 Apparently realizing his mistake, Parisi scurried to re-file the 
lawsuit, on the same date, in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia. 259 
Even still, the matter continued to meet with curious developments 
in terms of wasted time and expense. For example, despite filing the 
lawsuit on October 30, 2000, Parisi did not serve NetLearning with a 
copy of the complaint until February 5, 2001.260 This dilatory service 
formed at least a partial basis for NetLearning's Motion to Dismiss 
Parisi's complaint on the grounds that Parisi's complaint was an un-
timely motion to vacate an arbitrator's award (the UDRP panel's deci-
sion) under the FAA, which has a three-month deadline for filing 
256. See Domain Name Dispute Complaint Form, NetLearning, Inc. v. Parisi, No. 
FA0008000095471 (NAF Oct. 16, 2000) (Merhige, johnson & Sorkin, 
Arbs.) (on file with author). The relevant portion of the complaint form 
reads: 
Id. 
2. Complainant submits to court jurisdiction in (one of the fol-
lowing must be checked): 
_ The location of the principal office of the Registrar 
where the domain name was registered. 
The location of the domain name holder's address as 
shown for the registration of the domain name in Regis-
trar's Whois database at the time the complaint was submit-
ted to the Forum. Rule 3(b)(xiii) 
257. Id. Parisi's counsel also apparently misunderstood UDRPRule 3(b) (xiii), as 
his counsel transmitted a letter to the netlearning.com registrar with a copy 
of the complaint filed in the Southern District of New York as well as in-
structions not to transfer the domain name to NetLearning "pursuant to 
the relevant rules of the UDRP ... " despite the fact that the "relevant rules" 
clearly called for the complaint to be filed in a court of competentjurisdic-
tion located in Northern Virginia. See Letter from Ari Goldberger, Attorney 
at Law, to Michaeljohnson, Business Affairs Office, Network Solutions, Inc. 
(Oct. 26, 2000) (on file with author). 
258. See UDRP, supra note 2, § 4(k); NetLearning's Domain Name Dispute Com-
plaint Form, NetLeaming, Inc. (No. FA0008000095471) (NAF Oct. 16,2000) 
(Merhige, johnson & Sorkin, Arbs.) (on file with author); Parisi's Original 
Complaint, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (filed in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York). 
259. See Second Parisi Declaratory Relief Complaint, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (on 
file with author). 
260. Parisi, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 748 & n.6. 
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motions to vacate.261 The district court held that a UDRPdecision was 
not an arbitration decision subject to the FAA; therefore courts are 
not subject to the FAA's deferential limitations.262 
Following the court's ruling, the parties proceeded to written and oral 
discovery, including Rule 26 Disclosures, a Rule 26(f) Planning Meet-
ing and Report to Court, interrogatories, requests for production, and 
depositions of various witnesses and parties.263 Finally, in April 2002, 
nearly a year and a half after the October 2000 UDRP decision, the 
case went to trial before Judge Leonie Brinkema.264 
During the dispute, one of Parisi's primary arguments was that he 
could not have "registered" netlearning.com in "bad faith" because 
NetLearning was not incorporated when Parisi first registered the do-
main name.265 In response, NetLearning argued that, because a do-
main name registration expires after a set period of time, each time a 
registrant renews its registration constitutes a new "registration,"266 so 
subsequent renewals are subject to the UDRPs prohibition against 
registering and using a domain name in bad faith. 267 
This seemingly subtle point ultimately became very important be-
cause NetLearning argued that, while Parisi's original registration 
might not have been made in bad faith, his subsequent re-registra-
tions (and re-direction to the whitehouse. com website) were made 
with the bad faith goal of disparaging NetLearning.268 
At the bench trial's conclusion, Judge Brinkema indicated that she 
was inclined to agree with NetLearning's argument that subsequent 
re-registrations could not be made in bad faith. 269 However, before 
261. Id. at 749; 9 U.S.C. § 12 (2000). 
262. Id. at 745-46, 753. 
263. See, e.g., Deposition of Dan Parisi, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (on file with au-
thor); Deposition of Wayne Wood, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (on file with au-
thor); Plaintiff Dan Parisi's Objections and Responses to Defendant 
NetLearning's First Interrogatories and Document Requests, Parisi (No. 00-
1823-A) (on file with author). 
264. See Telephone Interview with Tony R. Dalton, Counsel for NetLearning, 
Woolf, McClane, Bright, Allen & Carpenter PLLC (Aug. 29, 2004). Inter-
estingly, the court record reflects that counsel for the parties thought they 
had settled this matter in October 2001. See NetLearning's Motion to En-
force Settlement Agreement at 2, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (on file with au-
thor). However, the record further reflects that Parisi refused to settle in 
accordance with the terms his counsel had seemed to agree. Id. 
265. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Judgment on the Pleadings at 1-2, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (on file with 
author). 
266. See NetLearning's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 9-10, Parisi, 
(No. 00-1823-A) (on file with author). 
267. Id. at 10. 
268. Id. at 9-11. 
269. See Telephone Interview with Tony R. Dalton, Counsel for NetLearning, 
Wolf, McClane, Bright, Allen & Carpenter PLLC (Aug. 29, 2004) (on file 
with author). 
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she could rule, Parisi and NetLearning abruptly settled their dispute 
and filed an Order of Dismissal on April 26, 2002.270 While the terms 
of the settlement were confidential, it is worth noting that NetLearn-
ing, Inc. is the current registrant for the netlearning.com domain 
name.271 
B. Lessons To Be Learned From Parisi v. NetLearning 
Ultimately, the dispute between Parisi and NetLearning presents a 
clear example of how the UDRP can fail its most basic goals of reduc-
ing litigation time and expenses. While hindsight is almost always fil-
led with clearer vision, even a cursory review reveals that NetLearning 
would have saved considerable time and expense if it had skipped the 
UDRP process and proceeded straight to court. 
In many respects, the UDRP did little more than delay NetLearning. 
For example, although the UDRP seeks to reduce the amount of time 
and money spent in a dispute, that simply was not the case, as evi-
denced by the more than 100 pages of pleadings filed in this suppos-
edly expedited process. 
What allowed for the filing of such a large amount of documents 
(and, presumably, legal fees for preparing those documents) under a 
mechanism designed to reduce filing and their attendant legal fees? 
The answer is simple: the UDRPs decision to allow dispute resolution 
providers to establish their own supplemental rules. Take for instance 
the National Arbitration Forum's supplemental rules. The UDRP 
gives each provider the autonomy to address technical and procedural 
issues such as fees, word limits, and page limits.272 In fact, the UDRPs 
only limitation on supplemental rules is that they "shall not be incon-
sistent with the Policy."273 
The NAF's rules provide that a complaint and a response shall not 
exceed ten pages.274 The parties may also "submit additional written 
270. See Agreed Order of Compromise and Dismissal, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (on 
file with author). 
271. NetLeaming, Inc. v. Parisi, FA0008000095471, pp. 1,5 (NAF Oct. 16,2000) 
(Merhige, Johnson & Sorkin, Arbs.), available at http://www.arb-forum. 
com/domains/decisions/95471.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2005) (on file with 
author). 
272. See Rules, supra note 2, R 1. 
273. Id. 
274. See NAP's Supplemental Rules, supra note 209, ~~ 4-5. While the NAF has 
amended its supplemental rules since the NetLeaming matter was filed in 
2000, it has not changed the ten-page limits to complaints and responses. 
See NAP's Supplemental Rules Pre-October 2000, supra note 241, ~~ 4-5. Even 
with the ten-page limit, it is unclear from the NAF supplemental rules 
whether exhibits or appendices are included within this limit or if the limit 
only applies to the actual pleading. If it is the latter, then the NAF supple-
mental rules would appear to allow an unlimited number of exhibits and/ 
or appendices to a complaint or response so long as the pleading itself did 
not exceed ten pages. 
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statements and documents" in support of the complaint or response 
within a five-day time period.275 However, the NAF's supplemental 
rules do not place any page or word limit on the additional written 
statements nor, for that matter, do they limit the number of addi-
tional statements that parties may submit.276 The result is that, under 
the NAF's rules, parties cannot exceed ten pages in their initial filings, 
but they are free to submit an unlimited number of pages of supple-
men tal filings. 277 
This obviously contradicts the UDRPs goal of providing an inexpen-
sive dispute resolution mechanism because, while the rules provide 
for an expedited time frame for resolving disputes,278 the rules do not 
prevent parties from submitting hundreds of pages of supplemental 
pleadings, likely expending thousands of additional dollars. That is 
exactly what happened in the dispute between NetLearning, Inc. and 
Parisi. 279 
To avoid this, the UDRP could have simply limited the number of 
pleadings each party could file as well as the number of pages for 
these filings. Failing to do so allows for situations such as the Parisi 
and NetLearning dispute where litigating a UDRP action simply adds 
another layer of expense toward resolving a dispute.28o 
Another example of inefficiency from the NetLearning-Parisi dis-
pute is the total lack of deference the federal trial court afforded the 
UDRP panel's factual findings or legal conclusions. The Parisi court 
specifically held that trial courts should review UDRP decisions de 
novo, basing this conclusion in part on the fact that "the UDRP itself' 
contemplates de novo review for UDRP decisions.281 This essentially 
eliminates the import of any legal conclusions or even factual findings 
made by the UDRP panel. The UDRP decision becomes nothing more 
than an extrajudicial viewpoint for a trial judge to potentially con-
sider-with no more legal precedence than a journal or law review 
article. 
As participation in the UDRP is contract-driven and, therefore, 
mandatory only for the domain name registrant, the UDRP cannot 
force an unwilling complainant to seek relief under the UDRP.282 
However, once a complainant decides to pursue a UDRP action, the 
UDRP drafters could have easily constructed a process more like bind-
ing arbitration so that a panel decision, even if appealed in court, 
would receive deference, and winning or losing a UDRP decision 
275. See NAF's Supplemental Rules, supra note 209, § 7. 
276. See id. 
277. See id. §§ 4, 7. 
278. See id. § 7. 
279. See supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text. 
280. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
281. Parisi, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 752. 
282. UDRP, supra note 2, §§ 1, 4. 
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would have at least some consequence. Instead, the UDRP is struc-
tured as a "mandatory administrative proceeding" that is meaningless 
in court. 283 
If NetLearning had anticipated Parisi's vigorous efforts to fight the 
transfer of the netlearning.com domain name, it would have made 
little sense for NetLearning to pursue a UDRP action. Going to court 
would have been more efficient because NetLearning could have 
saved the time and expense it incurred in litigating a UDRPaction that 
ended up having no substantive or procedural legal value. 
Ultimately, the dispute between NetLearning and Parisi over the 
netlearning.com domain name provides a clear, real-world example of 
the UDRPs problems. While some might respond that nobody can be 
certain when a party will contest a UDRP action, this reasoning is 
shortsighted. For matters in which negotiations have failed and par-
ties have exchanged various demand-like letters (or sometimes both), 
it does not require a crystal ball to predict the opposition's aggressive 
stance. This outcome can be gleaned easily from the parties' 
posturing. 
In these cases, despite its intentions of providing timely and inex-
pensive resolutions to domain name disputes, the UDRP provides 
neither because it allows for an unlimited number of supplemental 
pleadings,284 yet provides no deference if appealed in court.285 In-
stead, the dispute between NetLearning and Parisi demonstrates that, 
in a contested case, the UDRPmay be nothing more than an expensive 
prologue. 
v. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
The UDRP was conceived with noble goals: providing timely and in-
expensive resolutions to domain name disputes for an industry where 
timeliness is critical and the disputing parties are often individuals or 
small companies that lack the resources to pursue or defend a full-
blown lawsuit.286 However, the UDRPs decision not to structure itself 
as binding arbitration has led to a mechanism that denies parties any 
real level of finality because U. S. courts have refused to afford UDRP 
decisions deference.287 
The UDRP further suffers from the fact that individual dispute reso-
lution providers may adopt supplemental rules that essentially allow 
for unlimited pleadings.288 As a result, prosecution or defense of a 
UDRP action could indeed end up an expensive endeavor. Together, 
these failures have resulted in a dispute resolution mechanism that, in 
283. !d. § 4. 
284. See NAF's Supplemental Rules, supra note 209, § 7. 
285. See supra Part III.B. 
286. See Second Report, supra note 205, at 1[ 4.1(c). 
287. See supra Part III.B. 
288. See supra Part III.C. 
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contested matters, simply fails its intended purpose of quickly and 
inexpensively resolving domain name disputes. This leads to a final, 
important issue: Should the UDRP be revised to eliminate or reduce 
these inefficiencies and, if so, how? 
As to the first question, the answer is obviously yes. The concept of 
providing fast and inexpensive dispute resolution should not be re-
jected out of hand-the need for quick resolution concerning In-
ternet issues is paramount. Clearly, the UDRP is a very good idea. 
Unfortunately, as the concept developed, it lost its fonn so that today, 
for many domain name disputes, it can be more efficient to opt for a 
court-administered resolution. 
However, this does not have to be the case. Several structural 
changes can be made to achieve the UDRPs goals. The final section 
of this article outlines two proposals. 
A. Two Proposed UDRP Changes Designed to Enable the UDRP to Provide 
Quicker and Less Expensive Resolutions in Contested Domain Name 
Disputes 
Because the underlying UDRP goals of reduced time and reduced 
expense in resolving disputes are beneficial, the UDRP is certainly 
worth trying to fix so that these goals can be realized in manY' con-
tested cases. If implemented, the following two proposals would dra-
matically reduce the UDRPs existing inefficiencies providing these 
goals: 
1. Restructure UDRP Proceedings as Binding Arbitrations Subject to 
the Federal Arbitration Act 
As discussed above, many nations have embraced binding arbitra-
tion as a viable and acceptable mechanism for resolving disputes.289 
Despite this, the UDRPdrafters decided against binding arbitration.29o 
However, the WIPO Final Report indicated that after time passed and 
the UDRP developed, the structure should be reevaluated.291 That 
time is now. 
Restructuring the UDRP as binding arbitration would provide its de-
cisions with a deferential standard similar to the FAA.292 This would 
give decisions more weight and reliability because the FAA allows 
courts to overturn decisions only in narrow circumstances.293 Com-
plainants would be encouraged to pursue relief through the UDRP 
because, if they prevail, the victory is not rendered useless simply by 
filing a de novo court action. Similarly, the restructure should elimi-
289. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
290. See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text. 
291. See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text. 
292. See supra Parts 1II.B.1-2. 
293. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text. 
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nate the provisions that afford parties "Pre-Decision" and "Post-Deci-
sion" rights to avoid litigating a VDRP action.294 Until these changes 
occur, U.S. courts will continue to refuse to afford VDRP decisions 
deference which, in turn, will prohibit the VDRP from obtaining the 
level of finality necessary to convince complainants not to bypass the 
VDRP and proceed straight to court. 
2. Eliminate or Dramatically Reduce the Number and Length of Per-
mitted Supplemental Pleadings 
In addition to binding arbitration, the VDRP can eliminate or dra-
matically reduce the number of supplemental pleadings allowed and 
the length of those pleadings. This would help avoid a replay of the 
Parisi v. NetLeaming, Inc. dispute.295 The VDRPdoes not have to allow 
an unlimited number of pleadings. Allowing for unlimited filings 
leads to abuse and provides a tempting opportunity for participants to 
try to get in the proverbial last word. This is a simple step and one 
that the VDRP should take immediately to reign in inefficiencies re-
sulting from unlimited supplemental filings. 
In the end, the VDRPs current structure fails to serve its stated pur-
pose-at least for contested domain name disputes. As demonstrated 
by NetLeaming, Inc. v. Parisi, complainants who expect a VDRP action 
to be contested are often better served in court because filing a VDRP 
action will likely increase costs and delay resolution.296 Whether the 
VDRP truly becomes an efficient option will likely be determined by 
whether it can reevaluate its approach and adopt more efficient provi-
sions for all types of domain name disputes. Having passed its five-
year anniversary, now is a prime time for such a reassessment. 
294. See supra Part III.A.2. 
295. See supra Part IV.B. 
296. See supra Part III.B. 
